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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rafael Galvan challenges the jury's verdict finding him guilty of first
degree stalking and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Galvan argues
the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment rights through misconduct in
closing, and that his sentences are excessive.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Rafael Galvan and Lucina Vasquez Galvan had been married for 23
years, but separated in June of 2011. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 178, Ls. 11-12; p. 180, Ls.
2-6.) According to Lucina, their marital problems were caused by Galvan's anger
issues and increasing aggressiveness. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 179, Ls. 3-13.) In July
2011, Lucina got a protection order against Galvan. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 180, L. 18p. 181, L. 21.)

Galvan repeatedly violated that order, following Lucina by car

when she left work. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 218, Ls. 16-23.) At least twice, in August
2011, Lucina called 911 to report Galvan's violations. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 167, Ls.
17-19; p. 204, L. 5 - p. 205, L. 18; p. 214, L. 2 - p. 217, L. 19.)
A final incident happened January 2,2012. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 225, L. 23 - p.
230, L. 24; 5/15/12 Tr., p. 6, L. 23 - p. 7, L. 2.) On that day, Galvan drove to
Melaleuca, where Lucina worked, and confronted her in the parking lot. (5/14/12
Tr., p. 226, L. 5 - p. 230, L. 24.) During the confrontation, Galvan pulled a gun
and threatened to kill Lucina. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 229, L. 12 -po 230, L. 10; 5/15112
Tr., p. 6, L. 23 - p. 7, L. 2.)
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Melaleuca employee Alicia Luna was in the parking lot at the time.
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 110, Ls. 15-19; p. 112, Ls. 2-5.) Luna saw Galvan - who she
identified at trial - pull a gun and point it at someone in another car. (5/14/12 Tr.,
p. 112, Ls. 19-25; p. 113, Ls. 11-12; p. 115, Ls. 8-10.)

Luna recognized the

other car as belonging to her coworker Lucina. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 119, Ls. 23-25; p.
121, Ls. 21-24.) Scared, Luna left the parking lot and went inside where she told
her work-coordinator, Charity Schuldt, what she had seen. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 119,
Ls. 15-22.)
Schuldt called 911, then went out into the parking lot. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 141,
Ls. 15-17; p. 149, Ls. 1-10.) There, Schuldt heard a male voice arguing and
yelling, and saw Lucina leaning back in her car. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 149, Ls. 11-17;
p. 150, Ls. 8-9.) Schuldt saw a man stand up and walk toward his truck, then
saw Lucina get out of her car and walk toward the building. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 149,
Ls. 19-24.) According to Schuldt, the man then followed Lucina, but when he
saw a car come around the corner, he turned, got back in his truck, and left.
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 149, L. 25 - p. 150, L. 4.)
Bonneville County Sheriff's Deputy Bryan Summers arrested Galvan at his
sister's house. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 8-10; p. 57, Ls. 19-25.) Upon arrest, the
sister allowed Summers to search one bedroom. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 61, Ls. 4-5, 2325.) Galvan was advised of his Miranda rights, and agreed to talk. (5/15/12 Tr.,
p. 63, Ls. 16-22; p. 64, Ls. 4-6.) Galvan admitted that he had gone to Melaleuca
to see Lucina.

(5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 5-6.)

When Summers asked Galvan

about a firearm, Galvan did not respond. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 8-9.) At trial,
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Galvan testified that when asked, he denied having a gun. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 76,
Ls. 11-15.)
In closing, the prosecutor told the jury that the law did not require them to
believe all evidence before them; rather, it was the jury's duty to assign what
weight to give the evidence.

(5/15/12 Tr., p. 92, Ls. 17-21.) The prosecutor

argued that testimony by Luna and Schuldt should be given more weight, or
deemed more credible, than Galvan's. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 93, L. 2 - p. 94, L. 2.)
The jury found Galvan guilty of first degree stalking and aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon.

(R., pp. 40-41.)

The district court sentenced

Galvan to a term of 10 years with one and a half years fixed as to the January 2,
2012 incident. (R., pp. 48-49.) As to the stalking incidents between October 5
and January 2,2012\ the district court sentenced Galvan to a concurrent term of
four years with one and a half years fixed.

(R." pp. 119-20.)

Galvan filed

motions for leniency under Rule 35, which were denied. (R., pp. 51, 64, 133.)
Galvan timely appealed the judgments and order denying his Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp. 53-55, 65-67, 122-24.)

The charges, initially filed as two separate cases, were consolidated for trial and
on appeal. (R., pp. 25, 72.)
1
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ISSUES
Galvan states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the prosecuting attorney violate Mr. Galvan's state right and
federal right to remain silent and his federal right to due process
when, without objection, he commented on Mr. Galvan's postarrest, post Miranda silence during his closing argument?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for
aggravated assault and the deadly weapons enhancement and a
concurrent sentence of four years, with one and one-half years
fixed, for stalking in the first degree?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Galvan failed to show his Fifth Amendment rights were violated?

2.

Has Galvan failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Galvan Has Failed To Show His Fifth Amendment Rights Were Violated

A.

Introduction
Galvan asserts the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right against

self-incrimination in closing argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-10.) Although the
alleged misconduct was not objected-to at trial, Galvan argues it warrants
reversal under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010).

Galvan

cannot satisfy his burden here.

B.

Standard Of Review
The

appellate

court will

only

review an

unobjected-to

claim

of

prosecutorial misconduct where the appellant establishes that the alleged
conduct
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists ... ; and (3) was not harmless.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28,245 P.3d at 979-80.
C.

Galvan Waived - And Did Not Re-invoke - His Fifth Amendment Right To
Silence
Galvan

asserts

that

prosecutorial

misconduct

violated

his

Fifth

Amendment and due process rights, thus satisfying the first prong of Perry.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.)

In support, Galvan cites United States and Idaho

Supreme Court case law providing that a prosecutor may not use "post-arrest,
post-Miranda silence to impeach or as substantive evidence of guilt." (Id. (citing

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
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610 (1976); State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1,121 P.3d 416 (Ct. App. 2005).) But
critically, Galvan's analysis assumes - and omits discussion whether - Galvan's
Fifth Amendment rights were implicated. The record shows they were not.
It is undisputed that Galvan was advised of his Miranda rights. (5/15/12
Tr., p. 63, Ls. 16-22.) It is also undisputed that, after being so advised, Galvan
agreed to talk, and did answer questions by Deputy Summers. (5/15/12 Tr., p.
64, Ls. 4-6; p. 76, Ls. 11-15.) Where a suspect, understanding his rights, makes
a voluntary statement to police, "he waivers] his right to remain silent." Berghuis
v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, _, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010). Thus, the record
shows that Galvan waived his right to silence.
Having waived his right to silence, Galvan was in the same position with respect to invoking Fifth Amendment rights Thompkins.

as the defendant in

In that case, Thompkins was Mirandized, but never expressly

invoked his Fifth Amendment rights - either verbally or in writing.

1st

at 2256.

He was then "largely silent during the interrogation, which lasted about three
hours."

1st

(internal quotes and brackets omitted).

"About two hours and 45

minutes into the interrogation," Thompkins admitted "shooting that boy down."

1st at

2257. Thompkins contended he "invoked his privilege to remain silent by

not saying anything for a sufficient period of time."

1st

at 2259 (quotes and

brackets omitted). The Court rejected this argument, holding, for purposes of
Miranda, that invocation of the right to silence must be "unambiguous."
2259-60 (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).

1st

at

Just as

Thompkins' hours of silence did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, Galvan's
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seconds of silence after waiving his right to silence were equally ineffective to
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. See State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 524-25, 50
P.3d 1014, 1019-20 (2002) (reinvocation of Miranda rights after waiver must be
'''clear and unambiguous,'" quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459).
Decisions cited by Galvan are distinguishable.

In Ellington, Doyle, and

Dougherty, unlike here, there was no waiver. See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61,
253 P.3d at 735; Doyle, 426 U.S. 619; Dougherty, 142 Idaho at 3, 121 P.3d at
419.

In those cases, the defendants either invoked and did not waive Fifth

Amendment rights (Dougherty), or remained silent without invoking or waiving
their rights (Ellington and Doyle).

19.:.

In contrast, Galvan undisputedly waived

his right to silence, and did not re-invoke it.
The decision in State v. Cobell, 148 Idaho 349, 223 P.3d 291 (Ct. App.
2009), is also distinguishable from Galvan's case.

There, the defendant

received Miranda warnings and signed a waiver form. Cobell, 148 Idaho at 351,
223 P.3d at 293.

But after answering questions by police, Cobell then "told

detectives he did not wish to speak to them."

19.:.

The Cobell court held that the

trial court's decision allowing use at trial of defendant's silence after he invoked
his right was harmless error, and thus affirmed. Cobell, 148 Idaho at 353, 223
P.3d at 295.
Applying Thompkins, decided a year after Cobell, the trial court in that
case did not err. Rather, the prosecution's use of the defendant's post-Miranda,
post-waiver failure or refusal to answer questions was constitutionally valid. See

Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. at 2264.

This is because Due Process's implied
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assurance that a defendant's silence will not be used against him applies only
when the Fifth Amendment has been - and remains - invoked. See Dougherty,
142 Idaho at 4 (citing 142 Idaho at 4 (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618); Thompkins,
130 S.Ct. at 2264.
Galvan waived his Miranda rights and never invoked the right to silence.
(5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 5-9.) Under Thompkins, Galvan's responses and non-

responses during voluntary questioning were properly admitted. Thompkins, 130
S.Ct. at 2264; see also Salinas v. Texas, _ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2178, 2181
(2013) (privilege against self-incrimination, must be expressly invoked; simply
remaining silent will not invoke the privilege).

Accordingly, the prosecutor's

comments in closing argument addressing properly admitted evidence did not
violate an unwaived constitutional right, and were not plain error. Galvan thus
fails to satisfy the first two prongs of Perry.
D.

The Record Supports That The Prosecutor's Erroneous Comment Was
Harmless
Even if the first two prongs of Perry were satisfied, the appellate court will

not reverse where it concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the
alleged error, the outcome of trial would have been the same. State v. Thumm,
153 Idaho 533, 543, 285 P.3d 348, 358 (Ct. App. 2012).

Given the

overwhelming evidence admitted at trial, Galvan fails demonstrate this final
prong under Perry.
Lucina's testimony about Galvan's protection order violations in August
2011 was supported by testimony from Bonneville County Sheriff's Deputy
Broderick. (5/14/12 Tr. ,po 167, Ls. 17-19; p. 204, L. 5 - p. 205, L. 18; p. 214, L.
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2 - p. 217, L. 19; p. 218, Ls. 16-23; p. 225, L. 23 - p. 230, L. 24; 5/15/12 Tr., p.
57, Ls. 19-21.) Lucina's testimony about the January 2012 incident at Melaleuca
was corroborated by testimony from Melaleuca employees Luna and Schuldt.
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 112, Ls. 19-25; p. 113, Ls. 11-12; p. 115, Ls. 8-10; p. 149, Ls. 1117; p. 149, L. 25 - p. 150, L. 4; p. 150, Ls. 8-9; p. 229, L. 12 - p. 230, L. 10;

5/15/12 Tr., p. 6, L. 23 - p. 7, L. 2.) Luna and Schuldt did not know Lucina well;
the record does not support a reason to discredit their testimonies. (5/14/12 Tr.,
p. 122, Ls. 9-13; p. 140, Ls. 5-6.)
Also, Luna was consistent and firm that she saw Galvan point a gun at
Lucina. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 116, Ls. 19-25; p. 129, Ls. 17-24.) Luna testified that,
since the incident, her husband had taken her out shooting, and she was even
more "convinced that what [she] saw was a real gun." (5/14/12 Tr., p. 118, Ls. 610; p. 130, Ls. 4-5.)
Lucina testified that she feared Galvan's escalating aggressiveness.
(5/14/12 Tr., p. 179, Ls. 10-16; p. 183, Ls. 13-17; p. 187, Ls. 4-14; p. 188, Ls. 1022.) During an incident in August when Galvan followed her in her car down the
highway, he hit her car with his.

(5/14/12 Tr., p. 195, L. 1 - p. 196, L. 11.)

Lucina testified that she "was always ascared (sic) of him." (5/14/12 Tr., p. 199,
Ls. 11-12.) And since they separated, "he wasn't getting any better ... he was
getting worse and worse," and she believed "he was going to get to a point that
he will do something." (5/14/12 Tr., p. 199, Ls. 12-17.)
In the Melaleuca incident in January 2012, Lucina testified that Galvan
was calm at first, but got upset when she told him they were not going to get
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back together. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 2-8.) Lucina testified that he ordered her
to get into his car or he would kill her. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 9-11.) Galvan
became increasingly angry, pulled a gun, and said he would kill her, then
himself. (5/14/12 Tr., p. 229, Ls. 1-5.) Lucina testified that she begged him, "If
you ever loved me, don't ... kill me, because my kids need me." (5/15/12 Tr., p.
14, Ls. 15-20.) Galvan told her, "I won't do it because I love you so much and
because of my kids." (5/15/12 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 21-22.) But he told her not to call
the police, saying he would "never forgive" her for the first time he had ended up
in jail. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 13-18.)
In sharp contrast, Galvan testified he went to Melaleuca to tell Lucina he
had no money for child support and was moving out of state. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 70,
Ls. 6-10.) Galvan testified they did not argue. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 19-20.)
He did not pull out a gun. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 16-18.) He did not threaten
Lucina.

(5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 19-20.)

Instead, they talked; and after they

talked, she kissed him. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 22-23.)
When Deputy Summers arrested Galvan at his sister's house, Galvan
agreed to talk. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 64, Ls. 4-6.) Summers testified that when he
asked Galvan about having a firearm at Melaleuca, Galvan did not respond.
(5/15/12 Tr., p. 62, Ls. 8-9.)

When Galvan testified, he acknowledged being

asked if he had had a gun at Melaleuca.

(5/15/12 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 11-13.) In

conflict with Deputy Summers' testimony, Galvan testified that he denied having
had a gun. (5/15/12 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 14-15.)
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Given the record from trial, there is ample evidence for this Court to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's improper comment
did not affect the outcome of his trial.

Stated another way, the jury's guilty

verdict did not turn on the prosecutor's comment. Instead, the record supports
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Galvan guilty even if
the prosecutor had not commented in closing argument that a reasonable person
would have adamantly denied having a gun. Accordingly, Galvan has failed to
establish fundamental error warranting reversal.
II.
Galvan Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits
absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253
P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted).

Galvan does not dispute that his

sentence was within statutory limits. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) In reviewing for
abuse of discretion, the appellate court considers whether the district court (1)
was aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the scope of its
discretion and consistent with applicable law, and (3) reached its decision
through exercise of reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935,
941 (2011).
To meet his burden on appeal, Galvan must show his sentence is
excessive "under any reasonable view of the facts," considering the objectives of
criminal punishment: protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution or punishment. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313.

In

reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court independently
11

reviews the record, examining the nature of the offense, and the offender's
character.

State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011)

(citation omitted).

Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a

sentence is excessive, the appellate court will not disturb it. Miller, 151 Idaho at
834, 264 P.3d at 941 (citation omitted).
Galvan cites, as mitigating factors, that he has a very minimal criminal
record, that he is amenable to rehabilitation, and has owned his own roofing
business for six years. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) The offenses here were
crimes of domestic violence against his wife of 23 years, who has since divorced
him. (See 5/14/12 Tr., p. 178, Ls. 11-12; p. 178, Ls. 16-17.) Given the personal
and specific nature of Galvan's crime, the fact that he has an otherwise minimal
criminal record warrants little consideration.
In

his presentence investigation, Galvan never acknowledged nor

accepted any responsibility for his crime.

(PSI, pp. 3-4, 11.)

"admitted violence toward his daughter."

(PSI, p. 11.)

Galvan also

Although Galvan's

counsel argued at sentencing that he "has finally come to the determination he
doesn't want anything to do with his former spouse," this is not corroborated in
the PSI. (7/14/12 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 13-15; see PSI.) In his statement to the court,
Galvan said, "The only thing I want to say that I was not at fault for what
happened ... I was not at fault in my marriage ... I am not going to follow her
and I'm not going to live for her, but she is the one that messed up in our
marriage." Galvan's utter refusal to accept any responsibility for his crimes casts
considerable doubt on his rehabilitative potential.
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The district court noted for the record that it considered the PSI as well as
the objectives of criminal punishment, including "protection of society, deterrence
... , the possibility of rehabilitation and punishment." (7/24/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1521.)

The court also considered I.C. § 19-2521 as to Galvan's potential for

probation.
The court highlighted that Galvan's domestic violence evaluation showed
his re-offense danger was, on a scale of one to ten (ten being highest), eight with
treatment, and ten without treatment. (PSI, pp. 9; Attached Exhibit (Therapeutic
Interventions Evaluation); 7/24/12 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 14-16.)

The court also

expressed concern about Galvan's refusal to accept responsibility, and his
statement to the court blaming his wife. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 16-20.) Galvan's
persistence in blaming his wife and his refusal to accept responsibility caused
the court to question Galvan's statement that he was not going to have anything
to do with her. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 21, L. 21 - p. 22, L. 5.)
Ultimately, the court imposed a term of ten years with one and one-half
years fixed as to the aggravated assault charge. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 9-12.)
The court imposed a term of four years with one and one half years fixed as to
the stalking charge.

(7/24/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 13-17.)

The sentences were

imposed to run concurrently. (7/24/12 Tr., p. 22, L. 18.) Given the nature of the
crimes and evidence supporting Galvan's high probability of re-offense, these
sentences were generous in their leniency.

Galvan has failed to show the

sentences were excessive, or that the district court abused its discretion, under
any reasonable view of the facts.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment of
conviction and sentence.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013.

D~

Deputy

torney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of July, 2013, served a true
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SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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